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I. CoRPoRATE. LAW
A. New Legislation
The most significant legislation relating to corporations during the
survey period concerns (a) fractional shares and scrip and (b) the myr-
iad statutory changes necessary to conform Florida's Corporation Code
with the recently enacted corporate income tax code.
1. FRACTIONAL SHARES AND SCRIP
Florida became one of a growing number of jurisdictions to enact a
statutory provision' expressly authorizing the issuance of fractions of
shares and scrip. "Scrip" is a certificate exchangeable for shares or cash,
usually before a specified time. The issuance of fractional shares and
scrip often creates bookkeeping and administrative problems for the
issuing corporation. Where statutes were silent regarding such issuance,
the Secretary of State would often refuse to file corporate documents au-
thorizing fractional shares or scrip. Yet their issuance is often desirable
regarding such matters as stock dividends, splits, reorganizations and
mergers or consolidations. The Florida statute allows the issuance of
fractional shares or scrip for such purposes, as well as the making of
reasonable arrangements between the issuing corporation and its share-
holders regarding the purchase, sale or conversion of fractional interests
into full share interests.
Where fractional shares are issued, the rights of their holders re-
specting dividends, voting, preemptive rights and net assets on liquidation
have not always been adequately defined. The Florida statute declares
that the holder of a fractional share certificate is entitled to receive divi-
dends, exercise voting rights and participate in any asset distribution
upon liquidation, but makes no further specifications. In contrast, the
holder of scrip does not have any such rights unless otherwise provided
by the issuer.
This statute is a sound step forward in clarifying problems concern-
ing fractional shares and scrip. Further delineations of fractional share
and scrip holders' rights, as well as other clarifications, will hopefully be
forthcoming after an analysis of the statute's effectiveness and fairness
has been made.
1. Fla. Laws, 1972, ch. 72-95, § 1, creating FitL. STAT. § 608.151 (1973).
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2. CONFORMANCE WITH THE FLORIDA INCOME TAX CODE
The legislature amended and repealed numerous sections2 of Flor-
ida's Corporation Code to make it consistent with Florida's Corporate
Income Tax Code.3 Neither the inoperability or repeal of those sections
impairs or abates a corporation's liability for prior unpaid taxes.'
3. CORPORATE "RESTORATION"
Statutory amendments were enacted to allow a dissolved domestic
corporation or a foreign corporation whose permit to do business in Flor-
ida had been cancelled to "restore" its corporate entity or its permit to
do business in Florida.5 To do so, such corporation must file its current
annual report and pay various fees in lieu of capital stock or corporate
privilege taxes which would otherwise have been due. Moreover, the
owners of a majority of the capital or interest in any such domestic or
foreign corporation may effectuate the restoration of its good standing
with the state by following the same procedures.
4. MISCELLANEOUS
Florida's corporation laws6 were among the many statutes amended
to conform to the restructuring of Florida's court system in accordance
with revised article V of the Florida Constitution. Language changes were
also made to various corporate laws to create consistency with Florida's
corporate annual report and filing fee requirements."
B. Recent Decisions
Of the many judicial decisions relating to corporations, the most
important dealt with (a) the circumstances under which courts will
"pierce the corporate veil" to impose individual liability on the corporate
shareholders and (b) the liabilities of corporations and their officers and
directors.
1. CORPORATE TRADENAMES
Since corporate tradenames are proliferating, the problem of "trade-
name piracy" often arises. In Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. Buck-
master,8 a foreign corporation, not qualified to do business in Florida,
sought to enjoin a domestic corporation from doing business in a certain
2. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-333, § 157-58. See also Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-101.
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 220, formerly Fla. Laws, 1971, ch. 71-984.
4. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-333, §§ 157-58.
S. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-200, creating FLA. STAT. § 608.37 (1973), amending FLA. STAT.
§ 608.37(1)(2) (1971).
6. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-334.
7. Fla. Laws, 1972, ch. 72-218.
8. 256 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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Florida county under the tradename, "National Glass Company," the
same tradename which the plaintiff used in that county. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the plaintiff's evidence, which
showed only that the defendant may have had "subliminal" knowledge of
the plaintiff's tradename, was insufficient to prove that the defendant used
the tradename with either a fraudulent purpose or actual knowledge that
the tradename was being used by the plaintiff. Most defendants probably
will not fare as well under this standard as did the defendant in this
case, particularly where the plaintiff has advertised substantially in the
subject area, a fact which would tend to negate the defense of no actual
knowledge.
2. JURISDICTION
The corporate decisions dealing with the jurisdictional reach of
Florida's "long-arm" statutes over nonresident foreign corporations indi-
cate that Florida's courts will usually sustain jurisdiction when they
conclude it is fair or consistent with due process. Persons asserting such
jurisdiction will rarely suffer dismissal except where they fail to produce
some evidence supporting their naked allegations.
For example, in Eder Instrument v. Allen,9 the plaintiffs brought a
personal injury suit against a foreign corporation which had made and
sold an allegedly defective gastroscope to a Florida hospital. The plain-
tiffs obtained substituted service of process on the foreign corporation.
The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the
ground that it was not "doing business" in Florida. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion
on the ground that the record showed that the constitutionally required
"minimum contacts" were present. The defendant had "systematically
and regularly" sold its products for "pecuniary profit" to persons within
Florida and the cause of action had arisen out of the use of the defen-
dant's product in Florida. The court declared that public policy influ-
enced its conclusion that a supplier of a medical instrument having
intimate internal physical contact should be amenable to service of
process.10
9. 253 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
10. Id. at 906. That comment underscores the policy-rooted basis of most of these juris-
dictional cases. An example is the court's conclusion that the defendant was "systematically
and continuously" participating in sales of its products to Florida's citizens. The defendant
corporation was not licensed to do business in Florida. It had not solicited sales or dis-
played its medical products in Florida, but had advertised them in various unspecified medical
journals which the subject hospital administrators had read. The company did not have
any agents, brokers, wholesalers, distributors or detail men in Florida; it did not main-
tain an office or mailing address in Florida. The company's usual method of business
was to receive orders by mail and deliver the products by common carrier, F.O.B. Chicago.
The company mailed price lists upon request. During the three years preceding the lawsuit,
the defendant had sold about $5,000 of its products annually to Florida doctors and hos-
pitals. If the above acts constitute "systematic and regular" sale of products within Florida,
as the appellate court found, then what commercial acts would not come within that con-
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The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Richard Bertram &
Co. v. American Marine, Ltd.,"' held that a foreign corporation is ame-
nable to substituted service of process merely upon affidavits. The court
stated that the concurrence of uncontroverted matters contained within
otherwise conflicting affidavits showed that the defendant Hong Kong
corporation was "doing business" in Florida. Among other things, the
court declared that the affidavits showed that the subject dealership
agreement was entered into in Florida, the defendant advertised in Flor-
ida that the plaintiff was its agent12 and the defendant exercised control 3
over the plaintiff by requiring periodic inventory reports.
However, as Citizens & Southern Bank v. Popkin14 illustrates, mere
naked allegations of jurisdiction will not be upheld. In that case, the
plaintiff sought jurisdiction over a foreign corporation by substituted
service of process. The defendant moved to dismiss and supported its
motion by an affidavit. In response, the plaintiff merely restated the alle-
gations of his complaint but failed to substantiate his allegations by an
affidavit containing factual statements or other proof. Although the trial
court had denied the motion, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff failed to show facts
clearly justifying the use of substituted service of process.
Perhaps the decision in Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc. v. Dins-
more15 reflects the outer limits of the extension of personal jurisdiction
by the Florida courts. The plaintiff Florida corporation sued the defen-
dants, all nonresidents of Florida, for a brokerage commission related
to an acquisition of an interest in a Florida corporation. During the six
months it took to negotiate the transaction, only one of the defendants
briefly visited Florida to discuss the matter. All other negotiations tran-
spired in South Dakota or via telephone and mail between South Dakota
and Florida. The transaction was closed in Chicago.
The plaintiff obtained substituted service upon the defendants, who
were granted a dismissal by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff
had not shown that the defendants had the constitutionally required
minimum contacts with Florida. On appeal, the defendants argued that
cept? For a case where the systematic and regular contact is more apparent with Florida's
citizens, see Reader's Digest Ass'n v. State, 251 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) (advertise-
ments sent to at least 10,000 persons in Florida).
11. 258 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Bertram]. Compare
Compuguide Corp. v. Sachs, 259 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) (distinguishing Bertram)
with Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Feldman, 266 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) (affirming
on the basis of Bertram without further comment).
12. The agency factor, in connection with other factors, was also utilized to uphold
jurisdiction in 4th Dimension Interiors, Inc. v. Decorator Services, Ltd., 256 So. 2d 571
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
13. The control factor was utilized to negate jurisdiction in Compuguide Corp. v.
Sachs, 259 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), but was essential to upholding jurisdiction in
Martin Blumenthal Assoc., Inc. v. Dinsmore, 289 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
14. 281 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
15. 289 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Blumenthal].
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although they acquired stock in a Florida corporation and realized a
pecuniary benefit, their activity constituted a business venture carried
on outside of Florida. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
reversed on the basis that a single sale of corporate stock owned by non-
residents to a Florida purchaser through a Florida broker made the
nonresidents subject to substituted service where the nonresidents had
"some degree of control" over the personal property involved-their own
stock-and over the broker.16
3. VENUE
Two venue cases decided during the survey period reflect how legal
doctrines are utilized to effectuate different results in cases with slightly
varying factual patterns. In Al Stone Plumbing, Inc. v. Colonial Leasing
Co.,17 a foreign corporation sued the defendant in Dade County, Florida.
The defendant, which maintained its place of business in Pinellas County,
Florida, moved for a change of venue to Pinellas County, but its motion
was denied. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed, holding
that a defendant corporation may choose to be tried in the county of its resi-
dence when neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a resident of or
had its customary place of business in the county where the action was
filed, and when the claim for relief had not accrued in that county.
In contrast, in Merrill Stevens Yachts, Inc. v. Invin Yacht & Marine
Corp.,'s two domestic corporations with their principal places of business
in Dade County sued the defendant in Dade County. The defendant was
granted a transfer of venue to Pinellas County on the basis that it did
not have nor did it usually maintain an office in Dade County for its
customary business and because the claim for relief did not arise in
Dade County. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, again re-
versed the trial court and disallowed the transfer of venue, holding that
a claim for money owed, for which no place of payment was agreed upon,
could be brought in the county of the payee's residence since the claim
accrued there.
4. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Under what circumstances may a court pierce the fictional "cor-
porate veil" and hold the corporation's principals liable for its acts? This
16. For an example of a case where the plaintiffs lost the jurisdictional issue at the
trial court level because, among other reasons, they made the jurisdictional issue confusing
to the court, see Youngblood v. Citrus Assoc. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d
505 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). In any event, the court in that case should have allowed juris-
diction since it could have taken judicial notice that the defendant exchange did business
in Florida, as evidenced by its literature in most national brokerage houses in Florida. For
that reason among others, the validity of the decision is questionable. Martin Blumenthal
Assoc. Inc. v. Dinsmore, 289 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), provides an instructive
counterpoint.
17. 254 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
18. 276 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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issue has always been hotly contested since the result is usually of con-
siderable economic significance to the litigants. There have been a number
of recent cases involving this issue culminating in the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Levenstein v. Sapiro'9 (more commonly known as
the "Loans, Inc." case), to be analyzed below.
The time-honored legal rhetoric in Florida is that the courts are re-
luctant to pierce a corporate veil unless it is necessary to prevent injus-
tice.20 In Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State,21 the Supreme Court of Florida
declared that it would look through the screen of a corporate entity to
the individuals who compose it in cases in which the corporation is (a)
a mere device or sham to accomplish some ulterior purpose, (b) a mere
instrumentality or agent of another corporation or individual owning all
or most of its stock, or (c) where the purpose is to evade some statute
or to accomplish some fraud or illegal purpose.22
The supreme court apparently applied the agency or instrumentality
standard to the fascinating factual scenario of Levenstein. A corporation
with the decidedly Dickensian appellation of Loans, Inc., which was
wholly owned and controlled by one Sapiro, its president, sold some land.
Sapiro then assiduously dissolved Loans, Inc. Subsequently, the plaintiff
sued, among others, Sapiro and the defunct Loans, Inc. for breach of
contract. The supreme court framed the dispositive issue as "whether
the wholly owned and controlled corporation in this case should have its
corporate veil pierced so as to hold its president and owner liable for
breach of contract. ' 2 The court answered the issue affirmatively, holding
that where the relationship between an individual and a corporation is
"personalized," actual fraud does not have to be shown to pierce the
corporate veil and the individual may be found liable for a contractual
obligation made in the name of the corporation.
Although the Levenstein decision involved a wholly-owned close cor-
poration which was dissolved under inequitable circumstances leaving
the plaintiff without meaningful recourse against it, the court's language
does not appear restricted to that context since a "personalized" relation-
ship could also exist in a larger or publicly-owned corporation.
In House of Koscot Development Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics,
Inc.,24 the plaintiff sued a parent corporation, its subsidiary and the
principal allegedly controlling them for breach of contract. In the trial
court, the plaintiff successfully argued that the subsidiary was merely
the alter-ego of the parent and the principal, and that the jury should
pierce the corporate veil and hold them jointly liable.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, framed
19. 279 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Levenstein].
20. E.g., Robert's Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 1963).
21. 251 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Aztec Motel].
22. Id. at 852.
23. Levenstein v. Sapiro, 279 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 1973).
24. 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the issue as whether under Florida law there was sufficient evidence of
the "abuse" of the subsidiary's corporate entity to hold the controlling
person and/or the parent liable. Citing the supreme court's decision in
Aztec Motel25 as enunciating alternative rationales for establishing the
liability of an individual for the acts of a corporation, the court affirmed.
It stated that the evidence supported an inference that the principal con-
trolled the parent and subsidiary, used them as his personal "conduits"
or "instrumentalities" and caused the subject contract to be cancelled
to protect his own interests to the detriment of the subsidiary's welfare.26
The implication of these decisions seems to be that the corporate
shield can no longer be used where inequitable or unconscionable actions
are shown, regardless of what legal labels are ultimately placed upon the
rationale used to affix liability. The theories of (a) personalization, (b)
agency, conduit or instrumentality or (c) identity may be no more than
divergent linguistic formulations of the concept of unconscionability. In
any case, the parameters of these theories remain to be developed.2 7
5. CORPORATE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF AGENTS
As noted in the previous section, the mere legal form of a trans-
action may be disregarded in certain circumstances, particularly those
which appear to be unconscionable. The case of McCabe v. Howard"
illustrates this rationale. In McCabe, through the efforts of the plaintiff
broker, a corporation leased property with an option to purchase, but
never exercised the option. The property was thereafter acquired by the
corporation's president in his own name and the prior lease payments were
credited to his purchase payment. The broker sued, contending that, in
substance if not in form, the corporation had purchased the property. The
trial court directed a verdict against the plaintiff, but the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, reversed and remanded. The court held that
it was a jury question whether the corporation purchased the property
through its president. It declared that the jury was entitled to infer the
existence of an agency relationship even where both the alleged principal
and agent denied the existence of such an agency.
Can a corporation's agents create a contract which is not formalized
which binds the corporation? The District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, has ruled that the "intent" of the parties will govern. In Gateway
Cable T.V. v. Vikoa Construction Corp.,29 the defendant's finance direc-
25. The Supreme Court of Florida set forth several rationales including the instru-
mentality or agency theory. Neither the supreme court nor the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
articulated any precise standards for these alternative theories.
26. House of Koscot DeveL Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64, 66-7
(5th Cir. 1972).
27. It is clear, however, that increasing analysis must be made of the ethics, as well as
the present legality and form, of corporate action. See, e.g., Stiffer Rules for Business Ethics,
Bus. Wx. 87-90 (March 30, 1974).
28. 281 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as McCabe].
29. 253 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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tor, after detailed negotiations, told the plaintiff's president that "we have
a deal." The plaintiff sent its executed contract to the defendant and the
plaintiff began performing its duties under the contract. Subsequently,
the defendant attempted to get out of the contract on the ground that the
contract had not been consummated since it had not been signed by two
of its officials as required by the terms of the contract document. The
court held that evidence of the parties' conduct could be presented to
show whether there was a contractual agreement.80
However the decision in H.S.A., Inc. v. Harris-In-Hollywood, Inc.,81
illustrates that corporations cannot be held responsible for the acts of its
principals in their individual capacities who are not acting as corporate
agents or who are not known to be corporate agents. In H.S.A., a broker
sought to hold a corporation liable for alleged breach of an oral real
estate sales contract. The plaintiff had dealt with a non-party individual
whom the plaintiff apparently assumed to be the sole owner and principal
of the subject property. Actually, such individual was only one of the
officers of the defendant corporation which owned the property. The
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the plaintiff failed to
show the elements of the doctrine of "apparent authority" or "agency by
estoppel" since the record failed to show that (a) the plaintiff knew of the
existence of the principal or that (b) the plaintiff had any reason to be-
lieve the individual with whom he dealt was the principal's agent.
6. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE
ACTS OF AGENTS
In West Valley Estates, Inc. v. State,82 a Florida corporation was
found criminally liable for the illegal acts of its agent. The uncontroverted
facts showed that the corporation's vice president, a "mere salaried em-
ployee," was authorized to effectuate the subject dredging and that neither
the corporation's directors nor its president authorized illegal dredging
or knew that it occurred. Nevertheless, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that the evidence presented was sufficient to sus-
tain the criminal conviction of the corporation where it was shown that
the corporation's agent was in charge of the dredging operation, knew
the limits of the dredging permit and instructed the dredging contractor
to exceed those limits.
7. LIABILITY OF CORPORATE AGENTS
In CIC Leasing Corp. v. Dade Linen Furniture Co.,88 the plaintiff
alleged conversion against a potpourri of defendants, including the cor-
30. The court quoted the declaration of Lord Chancellor Sugden: "Tell me what you
have done under such a deed and I will tell you what the deed means." Id. at 464.
31. 285 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as H.S.A.].
32. 286 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
33. 279 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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poration, the secretary of the corporation and the president of the bank
where the corporation dealt. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
affirmed the liability of the defendants on the ground that they had acted
as the defendant corporation's agents in connection with the conversion.
The court declared that the officers and agents of a corporation are per-
sonally liable to any third person they injure as a consequence of their
tortious acts even if such acts are performed within the scope of their em-
ployment as corporate officers or agents.
Unfortunately, the decision does not explain the factual basis for
holding the banker liable other than noting that he endorsed and de-
posited a check for the defendant corporation.
8. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
a. Standing
Who should have the legal right to institute a derivative action on be-
half of a wholly-owned subsidiary when the directors of both the parent
and the subsidiary decline to address themselves to an alleged wrong? In
Crow v. Context Industries, Inc., 4 shareholders of the parent corporation
brought a derivative action on behalf of the parent charging the parent's
directors with corporate "waste" for failing to take legal action to recover
part of the alleged purchase price, paid under the guise of an employment
contract to the president of the wholly-owned subsidiary, to purchase the
assets of the subsidiary. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that the plaintiffs lacked "standing" to sue on behalf of the subsid-
iary, which the court declared was the only entity for which a derivative
action could be brought. The court's conclusion is questionable in light
of the fact that a federal court in Florida reached the opposite conclusion
on basically similar facts. 5 As a matter of sound policy, it would seem
that the shareholders of a parent corporation should be accorded the legal
right to ensure that the parent's wholly-owned subsidiaries and its con-
trolled affiliates are run in accordance with applicable laws. Otherwise,
there would be an open invitation for the very kinds of wrongs alleged
in Crow.
b. Security for Costs
In Industrial Electronics Associates, Inc. v. Poteat,0 the defendant
corporation argued that the trial court order requiring the plaintiffs to
post a $2500 bond was inadequate in light of the defendant's affidavits
34. 260 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
35. Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The federal court termed ar
action wherein a stockholder of a parent corporation sues to redress a wrong allegedly done
to a subsidiary as a "double" derivative action. Id. at 900-01.
36. 251 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See also Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
1244, 1247 (M.D. Fla. '1972), where the court ruled that it would consider certain claims as
derivative "at least" for cost security purposes. This curious statement was not explained.
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estimating litigation costs in excess of $12,000. The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that no showing had been made that the
trial court had abused its broad discretion since the statute gave the de-
fendant corporation the right to seek additional security whenever it
could show the security ordered was inadequate. This decision appears
sound since a fair application of the statute depends upon the trial court's
evaluation of the probable validity and good faith of the plaintiff's claims
as opposed to their harassment or "strike-suit" utilization.
9. RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
In Davidson v. Ecological Science Corp.87 the plaintiff sought a writ
of mandamus for production of the defendant corporation's shareholder
lists. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was prohibited from obtain-
ing the list because he intended to use the information "otherwise than
to protect his interest in the corporation." The trial court denied produc-
tion of the lists on the basis that the plaintiff's primary purpose for seek-
ing the list was to influence another lawsuit between himself and the cor-
poration. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed, holding
that a pending suit by or against the corporation or its employee was ir-
relevant and not per se sufficient to support the affirmative defense re-
quired by law. The court reasoned that if it allowed such a defense, a
corporation could always defeat a shareholder's right to inspect the share-
holder lists by filing a law suit against him.
10. CORPORATE DISSOLUTIONS
In Herbert v. Royal Enterprises, Inc.,8" the plaintiffs, who apparently
held 49% of the stock in the defendant corporation, sued to dissolve it.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the Florida dis-
solution statute under which the plaintiffs sued was inapplicable because
the total voting power of the corporation was not evenly divided into two
independent interests. Assuming that the subject corporation was a close
corporation, there is no discussion why the plaintiffs failed to avail them-
selves of the involuntary dissolution remedy provided by statute.89
In Chapman v. L&N Grove, Inc.,4" the court analyzed problems re-
lating to the determination of the effective date of a dissolution and of
post-dissolution judgments. On July 1, 1970, the defendant corporation's
stockholders approved a resolution of dissolution calling for liquidation
within the month of July, 1970. On July 24 and 30, respectively, the
Secretary of State issued and published a preliminary certificate of cor-
porate dissolution. On August 14, 1970, a law suit was filed against the
37. 266 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
38. 259 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
39. FLA. STAT. § 608.77 (1973).
40. 265 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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corporation. And, on August 20, 1970, a final certificate of dissolution
was issued.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the suit
was filed before the effective date of dissolution since the defendant's res-
olution failed to specify a date of dissolution and, in any case, dissolution
was not effective until the final certificate of dissolution was issued six
days after the law suit was filed. Moreover, the court declared that liqui-
dation and dissolution are not synonymous. The court also stated that
even though the judgment was rendered against the defendant after its
dissolution, the judgment was valid since it was rendered as a result of a
suit begun before the dissolution and was based upon a prior liability.
II. SECURITIES REGULATION
A. New Legislation
The most important legislation related to securities regulation of re-
cent date concerns (a) amendments narrowing the availability of several
transactions exempted from Florida's registration laws and (b) legisla-
tion designed to expand the jurisdictional reach of Florida's securities
laws. Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Division of Securities ef-
fected a massive overhauling of its rules governing the registration of
securities, the regulation of securities brokers and salesmen and various
significant general concepts.
1. JURISDICTION
Historically, the jurisdictional reach of Florida's securities laws has
encompassed securities dealers (including investment advisors) and sales-
men selling securities in Florida. Because of increasing problems associ-
ated with persons operating from outside of Florida, but selling securities
to Florida residents, the legislature enacted amendments 41 extending the
jurisdiction of Florida's securities laws to specifically embrace brokers
and salesmen selling securities to Florida residents from offices outside of
Florida, by mall or otherwise, such as via long-distance or WATS tele-
phonic communications. The Division of Securities can thus assert juris-
diction over any such persons so long as such assertion can be rationalized
as complying with due process.42 It is probable that the term "office" will
be liberally construed to effectuate the investor protection policies under-
lying Florida's securities laws.
41. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-68, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 517.02(4), .02(4)(d), .02(6)
and .12(1) (1971).
42. See section I,B,2 supra for decisions reflecting the extent to which long-arm juris-
dictional statutes have been stretched. Even though a transaction may be exempt from
registration, it is never exempt from the anti-fraud prohibitions under Florida law. FLA.
STAT. § 517.301 (1971). The same is true under the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 77q
(1970) (section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended).
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2. DISTRIBUTIONS AND REORGANIZATIONS
Formerly, only distributions and reorganizations by corporations
were exempted from registration under Florida's securities laws; now
such activities by trusts and partnerships are also exempted."8 When the
corporate exemption was originally enacted, entities other than corpora-
tions were not widely utilized. However, mushrooming tax laws have
caused the popularity of vehicles offering tax advantages, such as real
estate trusts and limited partnerships, to increase geometrically in num-
ber in relation to their social benefits. By broadening the exemption's
scope to include trusts and partnerships, the legislature acknowledged the
present fashionableness and social impact of such entities. The terms of
the statute do not make it clear, however, whether the term "partner-
ships" also includes limited partnerships, but it would seem that they
would be included since there is no persuasive policy reason why they
should not.
3. BONDS OR NOTES SECURED BY MORTGAGES
The exemption encompassing the sale of a mortgage, together with
all of the bonds or notes secured by it, was tightened by adding two new
conditions, one of which must be met by the person claiming the exemp-
tion.44 These conditions limit the total amount of indebtedness which may
be incurred against the property hypothecated as security for the bonds
or notes. These debt ceilings help protect investors by preventing the
overloading of debts against the property utilized as security.
4. LIMITED OFFERINGS
Florida's securities laws exempt from its registration requirements
"limited offerings." These were previously defined as sales of securities
by a corporation, trust or partnership during any 12 consecutive months
to not more than 20 persons. Sales to certain institutions were excluded
from the computation, but any sales made by a corporation pursuant to
the pre-incorporation subscription exemption were included within the
computation. Now included within the 20 person computation under the
amended limited offering exemption are sales made in connection with
"any" of the 17 "other" transactions exempted by Florida Statutes, sec-
tion 517.06 (1973).11 Thus, the limited offering exemption, which has
43. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-68, amending FLA. STAT. § 517.06(4) (1971).
44. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-68, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 517.06(7), (8) (1971).
45. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-68, amending FLA. STAT. § 517.06(11) (1971). Much relied
upon, this section exempts "sales" to 20 persons under certain conditions. Revised sections
517.06(7), (8), and (18) also refer to "sales" of securities. These subsections, among others,
reflect a curious and confusing lack of differentiation which seemingly exists under Florida's
securities statutes between an "offer" and a "sale." Section 517.02(3) defines a "sale" as
including "every disposition or attempt to dispose of a security or interest in a security for
value." AU of the exempted transactions under FLA. STAT. § 517.06 (1973) refer to the "sale"
of any security involved in transactions described therein. Does "sale" there connote a con-
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been widely relied upon, may be unavailable if any of the other transac-
tional exemptions have been claimed within 12 months of the date when
a person wishes to avail himself of the limited offering exemption.
The narrowing of the limited offering exemption reinforces the fact
that business entities must emphasize long-range financial planning.
Even then, anomalous results may occur. Suppose, for example, that a
corporation sells its securities to 20 of its executives under a qualified
stock option plan exempted by Florida Statutes section 517.06(18)
(1973), then six months later is approached by a limited group of so-
phisticated and monied investors who wish to take an investment position
in the company through their limited partnership. Must the corporation
refuse to sell them any unregistered securities for the next half year?
It is difficult to see what purposes such a statutory construction would
accomplish in terms of protecting these potential investors or in terms
of any other positive social or economic values. But, apparently the
corporation could not sell its securities in this context unless it could
avail itself of another exemption or unless it registered its securities,
which would probably be uneconomical.
There may be no meaningful solution to this kind of dilemma under
the present legislation since it may preclude administrative rules dealing
with the kind of problem described above. The most meaningful solution
seems to be a reassessment of the present system, particularly in terms
of the economic realities of small business financing, and the eventual
transition from the registration of securities to less economically crip-
pling forms for registration of business enterprises. The focus should
be to maintain a continuous flow of material facts to investors.
5. ESCROWED SECURITIES
Through legislation, the Division of Securities now has substantially
absolute discretion over the form, content and duration of escrow docu-
ments made in connection with securities issued for such matters as patent
rights, copyrights and trademarks, organizational or promotional fees and
good will or going concern value.46 The Division may require the escrow-
summated sale? If "sale" there means a "sale" as defined under section 517.06(2), does the
latter include offers as well as consummated sales? Assuming such, does the language of an
exemptive provision like section 517.06(11), which refers to the "consummation of the sale,"
make sense? At the least, this confusion detracts from meaningful analysis and advice.
The authors were unable to find sources explicating the reasoning underlying the original
enactment of section 517.02(3) but analogous statutes clearly distinguish offers from sales.
Section 401(i)(1)-(2) of the Uniform Securities Act differentiated them. And section 2(3)
of the Securities Act of 1933 made that distinction even sharper. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3)
(1970). Without this distinction, the language of chapter 517 tends to be confusing and mis-
leading. Florida's securities laws, especially section 517.02(3), should be amended to reflect
this distinction. The Florida Division of Securities has supported this distinction regarding
the exemptive provisions of section 517.06. This approach is sound since a contrary approach
could lead to anomalous and unjust results.
46. Fla. Laws, 1972, ch. 72-151, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 517.18 (1971). "Department"
refers to the Department of Banking and Finance. The Department's Division of Securities
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ing of the subject securities for as long as it deems in the "best interests"
of the entity's other shareholders. The Division will allow the escrowed
securities to be released upon such conditions as it deems "just and equi-
table." The escrowed securities include any cash or stock dividends and
any securities issued via a stock split or exchange, recapitalization or
business combination. The presumed intent of a statute such as this is to
protect investors. Whether such a laudable goal is attained by methods
such as this is not clear and is being questioned.47
6. MISCELLANEOUS
Several other amendments were made to Florida's securities laws.
As with the corporation laws, amendments were made conforming various
securities statutes with other laws effectuating Florida's restructured court
system.48 Annual appropriations were authorized to help administer Flor-
ida's securities laws more effectively.49
B. Rules of the Department of Banking and
Finance, Division of Securities
Almost all of the Division's former rules were revised and almost all
of them, other than those in chapter 3B-3, were renumbered. The more
significant changes are described herein.
1. CONTENT OF A PROSPECTUS
Whereas comparative illustrations, charts and pictures in prospec-
tuses were formerly prohibited, under the substantially revised rule, 0 they
are now allowed, but only when necessary for full and fair disclosure of
the material facts related to the issuer. Projections are also allowed under
the same standard which, despite its negativism, has important implica-
tions since it will finally allow investors to obtain some of the disclosures
long demanded and relied upon by professional and institutional inves-
(the "Division") makes rules implementing the securities laws. See also Fla. Div. Sec. R.
3B-1.08 regarding escrows.
47. Professor James S. Mofsky argues that state "merit" regulations are often detrimental
to small business financing. J. MoFsxY, BLuE SKY RESTRuCTIONS ON NEW Busnmss PRo-
MOTIONS (1971). See also the review of Professor Mofsky's book by Bell & Arky in 27 Bus.
LAw. 361 (1971); Symposium: The Operation and Effectiveness of Blue Sky Legislation, 15
WAYNE ST. L. REv. 1401 (1969). Professor Mofsky also advocates a sweeping reform of
Florida's securities laws focusing upon the elimination of "merit" standards, the elimination
of a requirement to register with the state, securities registered under the federal securities
laws, the partial elimination of broker-dealer regulations and the retention of strong anti-
fraud laws coupled with the staff and resources to enforce them. Mofsky, Reform of the
Florida Securities Laws, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1974).
48. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-334, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 517.20(2) (1971).
49. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-305, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 517.04(3) (1971). This
change was made to conform the statutory language to FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3(b), relating
to annual legislative sessions.
S0. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-1.02.
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tors.5x Drawings by artists, engineers or architects are prohibited on the
premise that they may be inaccurate since there is no assurance of com-
pletion of a given structure. However, accurate maps or surveys, as well
as "established" corporate symbols or trademarks, are permissible.
The same rule requires that the issuer disclose in its prospectus
whether it intends to furnish annual reports and whether such reports
will contain certified audited or unaudited financial statements. The is-
suer must also disclose the nature and frequency of other reports it may
issue and whether such reports contain certified audited or unaudited
financials.52 This amendment is significant because the issuer must com-
mit itself to quality and accuracy regarding periodic reports it intends to
distribute to its investors. Failure to live up to its commitments without
persuasive reasons for such failure could subject an issuer to allegations
of fraud.
2. PROMOTERS' EQUITY INVESTMENT
RATIO: LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
The sale of real estate packaged as securities has greatly increased.
A popular vehicle for the sale of real estate securities is the limited part-
nership, which also offers potential tax shelter benefits. The Division has
attempted to deal with this phenomenon by establishing standards for the
computation of the permissible promoters' equity investment ratio in
limited partnership offerings.5"
3. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
Another popular vehicle for public real estate offerings is the real
estate investment trust (REIT). The substantially revised standards gov-
erning REITs" provide that a REIT required to register its securities by
qualification must make provisions in its organizational documents satis-
fying eight detailed sets of conditions covering such matters as net assets,
annual expenses and transactions with related or affiliated persons.
4. INVESTMENT COMPANIES
One of the major problems with "investment companies"55 has been
the fact that money managers are rewarded only in relation to the increase
51. The soundness (and fairness) of restrictions against projections are being increasingly
questioned. See, e.g., Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973),
where the author, one of the foremost experts on securities accounting, argues that projections
are the "absolute key piece of information to any prospective securities investor. . . ." id.
at 634. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5362 (Feb. 2, 1973) (statement by the SEC on
disclosure of projections of future economic performance).
52. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-1.02.
53. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-1.04.
54. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-1.13. These conditions apply unless "directly contradictory" to
the intent of sections 856-58 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and applicable rules of
the Treasury Department.
55. The term "investment company" is defined by reference to the Investment Company
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of the assets of the companies they manage. In the past, particularly in
the conglomerate era of the 1960's, this stimulus caused too many money
managers to engage in unhealthy practices to stimulate their company's
earnings without regard to long-range performance.
The new rule56 addresses itself to incentive fees by requiring that
the economic penalty for a manager's poor performance shall be as great
as his reward for superior performance. The issue, though, is whether
this type of rule, even though logically consistent, simply reinforces the
stimulus to perform regardless of the costs. Would it not be sounder if
the rule directed itself to specific standards of prudence rather than allow-
ing itself to be swept up in the performance syndrome?
In any case, the rule also requires that investment companies dis-
seminate certified financial statements disclosing a net worth of at least
$100,000 and imposes limits upon the company's operating and manage-
ment expenses. These standards preclude excessive business expenditures
and help protect investors by requiring the companies to maintain stable
economic bases.
5. INDEPENDENT TRANSFER AGENTS
AND REGISTRARS
A significant step forward was taken to alleviate problems involving
transfer agents and/or registrars who are negligent or who perpetrate
fraud upon others. In general, this new rule57 requires every issuer of
registered securities, having over 100 shareholders of record after the dis-
tribution of its securities, to appoint and maintain an independent trans-
fer agent and/or registrar for its securities. There must also be an agency
agreement requiring that specified records, including records reflecting
offers and sales of unregistered securities, be maintained for at least six
years from their origination date.
6. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Current, complete and accurate financial statements are crucial to a
fair presentation of any company's financial status. Under its rule,58 the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(3) (1971). See Garrett, When Is An Investment Company? 37 U.
DET. L.J. 355 (1960).
56. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-1.17.
57. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-1.20. Regarding the necessity for legislative and administrative
controls similar to this rule, see Bell & Arky, Public Investor Protection and the Need for
Regulations of Transfer Agents, 26 Bus. LAw. 1649 (1971).
58. Fla. Div. Sec. X 3B-2.02. The Division's rules regarding financial statements are
basically patterned after the federal requirements. The form and content of financial state-
ments filed with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are governed by regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1970). These rules are being re-
vised constantly. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5427 (Oct. 4, 1973) (notice of
proposed amendments to regulation S-X providing for disclosure of significant accounting
policies); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5449 (Jan. 3, 1974) (disclosure of inventory
profits reflected in income in periods of rising prices). The federal regulations control
financial statements in periodic reports as well as in registration statements.
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Division accepts any financial statements prepared in accordance with
the strict federal laws. However, the financials must be audited by in-
dependent certified public accountants and prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles on a consolidated basis. Nor-
mally, a registrant must file (a) its certified balance sheet as of a date
within 90 days of the date it files its registration statement and (b) cer-
tified statements of profit and loss, changes in its financial position and
changes in its capital accounts.
The registrant must file the required financials for each of its last
two fiscal years (or such time as it has been in business) preceding the
date of its latest balance sheet filed, as well as for any period between
the close of the latest of such fiscal years and the date of its latest cer-
tified balance sheet.
A company in the "development" stage, including one which has not
begun operations, must file an audited balance sheet notwithstanding
the date of filing its registration statement. Such a company may file an
audited statement of cash receipts and disbursements in lieu of state-
ments of profit and loss.
In connection with contemplated acquisitions, if the registrant in-
tends to use any of the proceeds of the offering to purchase, directly or
indirectly, any business or portion thereof, financial statements of that
business or portion thereof must be filed as if such business were the
registrant.
7. DEFINITIONS
Eight new definitions50 crucial to understanding and complying with
Florida's securities laws were promulgated during the survey period.
"Division" refers to the "Division of Securities." Other terms defined are
"executive officer," "home office or principal office," "main Florida office,"
"branch office," "applicant" and "registrant."
The concept of "material information or adequate information,"
which is central to the disclosure requirements, was defined to encompass:
that information required to provide full disclosure of financial
and other information about the company and/or its securities
which would enable a prudent individual to make an informed
and realistic evaluation of the worth of the company and/or of
the securities offered.60
This definition of "material information" may, but does not seem
to, differ significantly from the concept of materiality enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.61
59. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-2.04.
60. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-2.04(8).
61. 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). The United States Supreme Court declared that in a case
involving primarily a failure of disclosure, a material fact is one a "reasonable investor
might have considered ... important in the making of [his] decision." Id. at 153-54. See
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8. CONTROLLING PERSONS
The Division defines a "controlling person" as:
Any person, corporation, trust, partnership, officer or di-
rector owning directly, or indirectly, equitabl [y] or beneficially,
individually or cumulatively with members of his immediate
family who owns or votes 10% or more of any class of the
issued and outstanding securities of any issuer .... 62
This definition of a controlling person differs materially from the
concept utilized under federal law, which defines "control" in the follow-
ing manner:
[T]he possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract,
or otherwise.63
Thus, a person could avoid being a control person under the Divi-
sion's 10% rule yet be deemed a control person under the broad federal
power standard. Adherence only to the Division's concept of control
could inadvertently cause liability to be imposed upon a person not cog-
nizant of the inconsistent concepts. At the least, the Division should make
it clear whether it intends for its rule to control in issues involving Flor-
ida's securities laws. This same sort of confusion exists regarding the
definition of "churning," which is discussed in section II, B, 11 infra.
9. ADVERTISING AND SALES LITERATURE
The deceptive or misleading use of sales material contravening the
legal purposes of a statutory prospectus are forbidden." Prohibited de-
vices include the distribution of non-factual data based on conjectural,
unfounded or extravagant claims or assertions. While this declaration
may be viewed as a more specific reassertion of the general anti-fraud
prohibitions of section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes (1971), it is im-
portant because it is an explicit prohibition of various types of deception
which still are being defended against as mere non-material opinions.
Such non-material "opinions" are outside the ambit of the anti-fraud
prohibitions against misrepresentations of material facts. 5
also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), which was cited by the United States Supreme
Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
62. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-2.06.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1970). Under the federal securities laws, controlling persons
are subject to a number of restrictions and potential liabilities. See Sommer, Who's "In
Control"?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw. 559 (1966). (Mr. Sommer was subsequently confirmed
as a SEC Commissioner). See also Pennaluna & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1969); Annot., 9 A.L.R. Fed. 639 (1971).
64. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-2.07.
65. See, e.g., Sparks v. State, 256 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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10. STATEMENTS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION, FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUTY OF
REASONABLE SUPERVISION
Generally, brokers registered in Florida must file certified financial
statements disclosing their financial condition.66 The Division's stan-
dards-generally patterned after analogous federal rules-specify the
records which dealers and investment advisors must have and maintain
regarding their operations and employees for a minimum of three years.67
These records must be maintained in Florida or made available upon the
Division's request for inspection. Dealers and investment advisors must
also have and continuously maintain a specified "net worth"; 8 the fail-
ure to comply with the net worth requirements will cause suspension of
the entity's business. Also, the rules now explicitly articulate the non-
delegable duty of reasonable supervision by declaring that a securities
dealer is responsible for the acts of his salesmen and executive officers
during their employment until actual notice of their termination is re-
ceived by the Division.69
11. CHURNING OR TWISTING
The Division's revised conceptualization of "churning" is totally
different from the concept generally utilized under federal law and
adopted by a Florida court. The Division defines twisting or churning
thusly:
No dealer, executive officer, or salesman shall disturb any insur-
ance or securities portfolio of a prospective investor, otherwise
known as "twisting" or "churning" which is defined as making
any false or misleading representations pertaining to or any
incomplete or fraudulent comparison with respect to any life
insurance policies, insurers, securities, mutual funds, or issuers
for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce any person to
cash in or convert any security or to lapse, forfeit, surrender or
terminate any life insurance policy for the purpose of sale or
purchase of securities, mutual funds or insurance.
In contrast, churning is defined under federal law to include:
66. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-3.01.
67. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-3.15 & 3.16.
68. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-1.17.
69. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-3.05(4)(a). In 1964, Congress enacted section 15(b)(5)(E) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780(b) (5) (E) (1974), which codified the
"duty of reasonable supervision" concept, and made inadequate supervision an independent
ground for sanctioning broker-dealers and associated persons. The SEC has repeatedly de-
clared that the "maintenance of adequate supervisory controls over salesmen's activities is
a basic and vital responsibility of the broker-dealer." L.B. Securities Corp., 42 S.E.C. 885,
888 (1966) (a case involving a Florida broker-dealer); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902,
916-17 (1960).
70. Fla. Div. Sec. R. 3B-3.08.
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[A] ny act of any broker or dealer designed to effect with or for
any customer's account, in respect to which such broker or
dealer or his agent or employer is vested with any discretionary
power any transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive
in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and char-
acter of such account. 1
And in Hayden, Stone, Inc. v. Brown,72 the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, adopted the generally accepted definition, treating churn-
ing as engaging an account in transactions which are "excessive in size
and frequency in view of the financial resources and character of the
account.
' 73
The Division's conceptualization of churning, which prohibits fraud-
ulently tending to induce a person to convert his securities or insurance
portfolio for the purpose of generating commissions upon subsequent
securities or insurance transactions, is a specific prohibition which does
not seem dependent upon the criteria historically utilized to determine
churning. Thus, potential liability exists under dual concepts of churning.
C. Recent Decisions
Florida's state and federal courts grappled with difficult issues in
the securities area. The most noteworthy decisions dealt with (a) the
issue of what constitutes a security, (b) the scope of the reorganization
transactional exemption, (c) what statutes of limitations should apply
to securities claims and (d) the perennial problem of differentiating facts
from opinions.
1. DEFINITION OF A "SECURITY"
What constitutes a "security" under Florida's securities statutes?
This remains a difficult issue to answer at its outer parameters since
courts may utilize different standards to construe the statutory language.
And, as always, ingenious minds continuously seek to fashion new busi-
ness forms to circumvent the strict registration and anti-fraud provisions
of Florida's securities laws. Recent decisions have begun to explore the
applicability of Florida's securities laws to some of these new business
forms.
In Frye v. Taylor,4 the issue was whether the offer and sale of a
"supervisorship" position in a pyramid franchising enterprise consti-
tuted the species of security defined as an "interest in or under a profit
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1scl-7a. See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp.
417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd and modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Powers v. Francis
I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
72. 218 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 225 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1969) ; Annot.,
32 A.L.R.3d 623, 635 (1969) (stockbroker's liability for allegedly "churning" or engaging
customer's account in excessive activity).
73. Hayden, Stone, Inc. v. Brown, 218 So. 2d 230, 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
74. 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Frye].
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sharing or participation agreement or scheme." '75 Without discussion, but
with express reliance upon the broad policy-based decisions in Florida
Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori76 and State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer
Business System, Inc.,77 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that the transaction encompassing the plaintiff's sale of the super-
visorship position in the subject enterprise came within this definition.
The unanswered question is whether the Florida courts have adopted
the "risk capital" rationale for defining a security. The "risk capital"
definition of a security may be generalized as encompassing those factual
contexts wherein persons subject their capital or assets to the risks of a
business enterprise over which they have no meaningful control.7 ' The
Florida Court's language implies that it may have adopted the "risk
capital" standard since it relied upon both the Consumer Business deci-
sion, which expressly followed such rationale, and upon the Florida Dis-
count decision in which the Supreme Court of Florida declared that the
"statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be
thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae. 79
Subsequently, in Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.s0 the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the subject company's "di-
rectorship" agreements also constituted securities under Florida law.
The Court declared that Frye controlled, but again failed to articulate
the basis for its decision.
75. The term "security" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 517.02(1) (1971). See Mofsky, Some
Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Security," 27 U. MIAM L. RPv. 395 (1973).
76. 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). aff'd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as Florida Discount].
77. 482 P.2d 549, 5 Ore. App. 19 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Consumer Business],
in which the court relied upon the now famous decision by Judge Roger Traynor in Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961),
wherein he enunciated the so-called "risk capital" rationale for defining a security.
78. For an analysis of the Frye and related decisions, see Bell, Evolution of Florida
Securities Law, 47 FLA. BAR J. 48 (1973). See also the discussion of various concepts of
what constitutes a security in Mofsky,The Expanding Definition of "Security" Under the
Blue Sky Laws, 1 S c. REo. L.J. 217 (1973).
79. Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969),
quoting Mr. Justice Murphy in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946), one of
the first landmark United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the definition of a
security. Ironically, the WJ. Howey case originated in Florida. See Tew & Freedman, In
Support of SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic
Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAxr L.
Rzv. 407 (1973).
80. 276 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). See also Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), wherein the court held that the plaintiffs alleged a
claim for relief under the Florida securities laws.
Of particular interest to Florida practitioners, the SEC has issued its guidelines con-
cerning the applicability of the federal securities laws to the offer and sale of condominiums
or units in real estate developments, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973),
and, regarding advertising and sales practices related thereto, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5382 (April 9, 1973). See also Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and
Securities Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L.
REv. 350 (1973) ; Note, Application of the Securities Doctrine of Integration to Real Estate
Syndicates, 46 S. CAL. L. Rav. 428 (1973).
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The implications of the Frye and Bond decisions may be far-reaching
since the risk capital standard would bring within the penumbra of the
securities laws many franchises, distributorships, syndications and anal-
ogous investment-based relationships which often would not otherwise
come within the scope of more conservative conceptualizations of a
security.
2. EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION
The Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Data Lease Financial
Corp. v. Baradl has significant implications. Briefly, the facts were that
Data Lease acquired Discount Drugs by issuing its voting stock for the
stock of Discount, which underwent a tax-free reorganization as part of
the transaction. Both entities were apparently Florida close corporations.
Subsequently, shareholders of Discount sought to void the acquisition on
the ground that Data Lease failed to register its stock. Data Lease
claimed the transaction was exempt and that the plaintiffs were estopped
by their acceptance of contractual benefits.
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the record did not support
a finding of estoppel against the plaintiffs. The court declared:
The instant action was not an equitable suit for recision [sic],
but was brought to void the transaction under a statute specifi-
cally requiring registration and making sales of unregistered
stock voidable where statutory requirements are not met. In
such a situation, estoppel is applicable only where the purchaser
himself is in pari delicto, participates in the management of the
issuing corporation, or where some unusual circumstances exist
justifying application of the doctrine of estoppel.
8 2
Thus, the supreme court recognized the sui generis nature of section
517.21 of the Florida Statutes (1971) as a statutory remedy distinct from
an equitable claim for rescission.88 It appears that the court has repudi-
ated the defense of estoppel in the securities context except in unusual
circumstances.8 4
Secondly, the court held that a corporate "B" reorganization qualify-
ing for tax-free treatment as an acquisition of stock for voting stock is
not necessarily exempt from registration as a bona fide reorganization
since the purposes of tax reorganizations are different from the reasons
.81. 291 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1974).
82. Id. at 612.
83. Compare Davis v. McGahee, 257 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), and Henderson v.
Hayden, Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972).
84. The conflicting public policies regarding the appropriateness of equitable defenses
such as in pan delicto and laches in the context of the securities laws are analyzed in Bell,
How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-the Validity of Common Law Defenses to Private
Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FEA. L. REv. 1 (1970). Compare
Murrell v. Jupiter Corp., 274 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), wherein the court held that
the plaintiff should be barred by laches after sporadically pursuing a claim for 20 years.
1974] CORPORATE LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 945
underlying reorganizations under the securities laws. 5 The court did
not explain its conclusion but, in any case, it is true that the tax laws are
not concerned with the timely disclosure of material facts to investors,
which is the basic thrust of the securities laws.
Third, the Data Lease court held that a transaction wherein a cor-
poration issues its unregistered securities to the stockholders of a second
corporation undergoing a bona fide reorganization is not exempt from
registration." The exemption applies only to a corporation undergoing
a bona fide reorganization which issues its stock to its own existing
shareholders.
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's claim that its acquisition
was exempted since it was in connection with a merger, consolidation or
sale of assets. 87 There was no sale of assets since the defendant purchased
only the stock, not the assets, of the acquired company. And there was
not a merger or consolidation since both corporations continued their
existence after the acquisition.
The Data Lease decision is important in that the court applied Flor-
ida's securities laws to void a transaction apparently involving two closely
held corporations. The dissenting judge believed that this application
had not been "traditionally" made under Florida law.88 Even if that
were so, the effectiveness of the securities laws would be severely under-
mined unless all securities transactions, including those termed "private,"
were required to comply with the terms of any exemption claimed. If
such were not the law, the exemptions could be easily flaunted.89 The
85. Data Lease Fin. Corp. v. Barad, 291 So. 2d 608, 612 (Fla. 1974). The court was
construing the terms of the corporate reorganization exemption, FLA. STAT. § 517.06(4)
(1971).
86. Id. at 612. Again, the court was construing the language and purpose of FrA. STAT.
§ 517.06(4) (1971).
87. Id. at 613. Here the court was addressing itself to the business combination excep-
tion of FLA. STAT. § 517.06(6) (1971). For the federal registration requirements regarding
business combinations, see note 89 infra.
88. 291 So. 2d at 613-14.
89. See note 42 supra. Any statutory "person," as defined by FLA. STAT. § 517.02(2)
(1971), claiming an exemption under the Florida securities statutes in connection with
exempted securities, FLA. STAT. § 517.05 (1973), or exempted transactions, FLA. STAT. § 517.06
(1973), conceptually has the burden of proving his right to such exemption under Florida
law and under any other applicable state securities laws and federal law.
Two exemptions frequently claimed under Florida law are the so-called "pre-incorpora-
tion" exemption, FLA. STAT. § 517.06(10) (1973), and the "limited offering" exemption,
FtA. STAT. § 517.06(11) (1973). Federal analogies often claimed are the "private offering"
exemption under section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), and
the "intrastate offering" exemption of section 3(a) (11) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a) (11) (1970). The SEC has issued important interpretative releases attempting to
clarify private offerings under federal law, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487 (April 23,
1974) (notice of adoption of rule 146), and attempted to clarify intrastate offerings there-
under, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974) (adoption of rule 147). See also
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (adoption of rule 144 regarding the
resale of restricted or unrestricted securities) ; SEC Securities Act Release No. 5226 (Jan. 10,
1972) (applicability of the federal anti-fraud provisions to private offerings); and SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5306 (Sept. 26, 1972) (the Division of Corporation Finance's
interpretations of rule 144).
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Data Lease decision apparently applies to all "private" or "closed"
transactions in existence and being formed in Florida.
3. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A recurring issue involving the Florida securities laws concerns the
choice of the "most applicable" Florida statute of limitation where viola-
tions of the Florida securities laws are alleged." This issue surfaces
frequently when claims are brought under the Florida and/or federal
securities laws.
In a case brought under the federal securities laws, Josef's of Palm
Beach, Inc. v. Southern Investment Co.,91 the issue was which statute of
limitation, Florida Statutes section 517.21 (1971) (two years) or section
95.11(5)(d) (1971) (three years), was the "most applicable" statute
governing the case. Despite the court's acknowledgment that it should
choose the statute which would best effectuate the underlying federal
policies enunciated in Azalea Meats Inc. v. Muscat,92 the court held that
It should be noted that a correlation of rule 146 to Florida's securities laws poses difficult
issues. Rule 146 is broader than Florida's limited offering exemption, FLA. STAT. § 517.06(11)
(1973) which allows only up to 20 "sales," a term of art which itself is unclear under Flor-
ida's securities laws; see note 45 supra. Rule 146 has been criticized as confusing and com-
plex. Wander & Shevitz, "Rule 146 Adopted," 7 REV. SEc. REo. 911 (1974).
The SEC has also issued proposed rule 240, which would allow an exemption from regis-
tration for limited individual transactions-as opposed to offerings-of securities by closely-
held issuers. The aggregate sales price for all securities sold during any 12 consecutive month
period would be limited to $100,000. Only 25 purchasers would be allowed. Moreover, the
issuer could have only a maximum of 50 beneficial owners of its securities. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5499 (June 3, 1974). This proposed rule has not yet been adopted. Thus,
it may undergo substantial revision before its possible finalization.
Regarding the applicability of the federal registration requirements to business combi-
nations, see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972) (adoption of rules 145 &
153A regarding "business combinations" and the prospective rescission of rule 133-the "no-
sale" rule-which formerly applied to such business combinations); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5243 (Apr. 12, 1972) (applicability of rule 144 to rule 133 business combinations
and to stock bonus or similar plans).
Florida practitioners should also scrutinize two important decisions by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit construing the federal private offering exemption: Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Fran., Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971), and SEC v. Continental
Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972). The Continental Tobacco decision has been
viewed by many experts as unrealistic. See, e.g., Garrett, Private Placements, 5 REv. SEc.
Ra. 859 (1972).
90. FLA. STAT. § 517.21 (1971), declares, inter alia, that "no action shall be brought for
the recovery of the purchase price after two years from the date of such sale." Neither
FrA. STAT. § 517.301 (1971), Florida's general anti-fraud prohibition, nor its federal
counterpart, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970), and rule 10b-9 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970), contain a
statute of limitations.
91. 349 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Josef's of Palm
Beach].
92. 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967) [hereinafter referred to as Azalea Meats]. The court
adopted the three year limitation as best implementing the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), that a fundamental
purpose of the federal securities laws is to substitute the philosophy of "full disclosure"
for the archaic concept of caveat emptor ("let the buyer beware") and thus to promote
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry. Id. at 186.
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the shorter two year statute was the most appropriate. The court appar-
ently ignored both Azalea Meats and Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King
International, Inc." In Beefy Trail the Court held that Azalea Meats
required that it look to the longer state statute of limitations in actions
for securities fraud.
The question of which Florida statute of limitation applies was also
litigated in another federal case, Sargent v. Genesco.9 4 The defendants
in that case argued that (a) the two year limit should control absolutely
and that (b) the two year period should commence at the time of the
alleged violation regardless of when the plaintiffs became aware of the
securities violations.9 5 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida rejected these contentions, holding that the longer
three year statute of limitations applied and, by implication, that the
broader "discovery" standard determined when the three year period
began to run.
Thus, both the Sargent and losers of Palm Beach decisions followed
the Azalea Meats standard, holding that the statute of limitations began
to run upon discovery of the alleged violation by the plaintiff, which
occurs when he has acquired either (a) actual knowledge of the alleged
violation or (b) notice of facts which, in the exercise of due diligence,
would have led the plaintiff to actual knowledge of the alleged violation."
Although the federal courts follow federal law regarding the discovery
issue, the same test should control in cases brought under Florida law to
effectuate fully the legislative purposes and policies underlying the lib-
erally construed Florida securities laws and rules of civil procedure.
4. PENDENT JURISDICTION
An increasing number of claims have been filed in federal courts
alleging primary jurisdiction under the federal securities laws and
"pendent" jurisdiction over the Florida claims, thus seeking a determina-
tion of the pendent claims in the federal forum. In Ratner v. Scientific
Resources Corp.,97 the defendants argued, inter alia, that even though the
court may have had jurisdiction over the federal claims, it lacked subject
93. 348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972). Cf. Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1973), in which the court found that the plaintiff commenced the action within either the
two or three year period.
94. 352 F. Supp. 66 (M.D. Fla. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Sargent].
95. The defendants relied upon Fowler v. Matheny, 184 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966),
wherein the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the right to bring a claim
under FrA. STAT. § 517.21 (1971) "terminated" when the two year period after the sale ran
despite the plaintiffs' claim that the fraud had been concealed and that they had discovered
it within two years of filing their action. The court did not analyze the statute in terms of the
underlying legislative purposes and policies.
96. Josef's of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Southern Inv. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057, 1061. See also
Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1971). It appears that if a limitations
period were deemed to run mechanically, regardless of when the plaintiff discovered the
violation, there would be a mockery of justice in many cases.
97. 53 F.R.D. 325 (S.D. Fla. 1971), appeal dismissed, 462 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1972).
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matter jurisdiction over the claims arising under Florida's securities laws.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
held that it had jurisdiction over the pendent claims. Subsequently, in
other cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld pendent jurisdic-
tion over claims arising under Florida's securities acts and under Florida
common-law.9
The issue of the permissible methods of service of process in pendent
jurisdiction cases based upon a common nucleus of facts has also been
raised. In Ratner, it was argued that although the federal securities
statute involved99 allowed out-of-state service of process for federal
claims, it did not allow the same scope of service of process for pendent
claims under Florida's securities laws or under common law. Following
what "seemed" to be the rule applied in the majority of cases, the court
held that the federal service of process provision was inapplicable to the
pendent claims. However, other courts have ruled differently on the same
issue. Thus, Judge Lord, after articulating the policies of economy, con-
venience and fairness underlying the concept of pendent jurisdiction,
held in In re Penn Central Securities Litigation,1°° that the federal secu-
rities laws impliedly extended their jurisdictional provisions to interre-
lated state claims giving rise to pendent subject matter jurisdiction.
5. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Criminal decisions under Florida's securities laws have been rather
infrequent and as Sparks v. State'01 demonstrates, have usually been of
limited social significance. Most prosecutions have apparently been
brought against an individual defendant for one or a few violations.
Assuming a limitation of manpower and resources, this type of enforce-
ment may be defensible. On the other hand, since the rationale of selec-
tive enforcement necessarily includes some notion of maximizing the
social impact of cases pursued, the validity of bringing relatively insig-
nificant cases like Sparks is dubious unless justifiable on some other basis.
The Sparks case is instructive because it demonstrates the invalidity
of ancient doctrines in light of actual selling practices in the securities
context. In Sparks, the state filed a criminal information alleging that
the defendant (1) was not a registered securities dealer, (2) sold unreg-
istered securities and (3) fraudulently misrepresented a material fact
in connection with a sale of securities. Sparks was found guilty on all
counts and given concurrent sentences upon each of them. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that although counts (1) and (2)
alleged violations of separate statutes and Sparks was convicted on each
98. Kasner v. Hentz & Co., 475 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1973). Compare McCurin v. Kohl-
meyer & Co., 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1972).
99. Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970).
100. 338 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
101. 256 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Sparks].
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count, he should have been subjected to only one sentence since his
offenses, even though separate, were part of a "single transaction." 10 2
The court thus affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for im-
position of a single sentence.
Sparks was also convicted for misrepresenting a material fact. A
purchaser of the subject stock testified that he bought it primarily be-
cause Sparks declared that the stock "would triple in value in six months
time .... 1o3 The appellate court reversed Sparks' fraud conviction, hold-
ing that the statement was merely an "expression of opinion relating to a
future event'104 and thus was not a statement of fact. This holding, al-
though not inconsistent with common-law doctrine, appears inappropri-
ate in view of both the public interest policies underlying Florida's secu-
rities laws and the realities of securities sales techniques.105
When do criminal sanctions outstrip their purposes and become
cruel and unusual? In Godfrey v. State,10° the defendant was convicted
102. The court relied upon Easton v. State, 250 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. '1971), in
which that court reiterated the "single transaction" concept.
103. Sparks v. State, 256 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
104. Id. at 538.
105. The ancient "fact-opinion" dichotomy derives from a common law postulate which
assumed that parties dealt at arm's length and that each person was "competent" to look
after his own interests. This fiction has never had much validity when measured against
reality and is inappropriate in the securities context where substance is supposed to govern.
As Dean Prosser stated, it is not the "form" of a statement or representation that is sig-
nificant-it is rather the "sense in which it is reasonably understood." W. PRossER, LAW or
TORTs 720 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser also noted the tendency of courts to treat statements of
value or predictions as covering something more than mere opinion, thus affording relief
to aggrieved persons within the framework of evolving common law standards. Id. at 723-24.
In broker-dealer administrative proceedings, the SEC long ago sliced apart the defense
that predictions or promises of future value are mere opinions and not facts. The SEC has
long held that representations, whether couched in terms of opinion or fact, which are made
without a reasonable basis in fact and designed to induce securities transactions, are contrary
to the fundamental duty of fair dealing imposed upon persons selling securities. F.S. Johns
& Co., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 124, 129 (1966) ; Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 116, 119 (1962),
aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). Moreover, the prediction of a
specific and substantial price increase of a promotional and speculative security within a
relatively short time period is deemed unjustifiable and thus inherently fraudulent. Underhill
Securities Corp., 42 S.E.C. 689, 693 (1965); Mac Robbins & Co., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 116, 131
(1962).
Although the SEC decisions were not in a criminal context, the basic duty of "fair
dealing" should not be altered because of the nature of the charges. Only the quantum of
proof should change. Requiring a reasonable factual basis for representations would merely
reflect the reality that the heart of many, perhaps most, securities transactions is the "sales
pitch" made to potential investors, whether through personal communications or through
press releases and the media.
In any case, the standard of "fair dealing" would be merely a carry-over of the "reason-
ableness" doctrines pervasive throughout common law. Florida courts are becoming more
reluctant to allow the "opinion" defense; thus, in Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d
906 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), the court declared that misrepresentations, even of opinions,
are actionable where there is shown (a) a fiduciary relationship, (b) an "artifice or trick
employed by the representor," (c) a context in which the parties did "not in general deal
at arm's length," or (d) a context in which the "representee does not have equal oppor-
tunity to become apprised of the truth or falsity of the fact represented." Id. at 908-09.
106. 278 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Godfrey].
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
on five counts alleging unlawful sales of securities and ultimately sen-
tenced to imprisonment for five concurrent terms of five years each. On
appeal, the defendant argued that these sentences constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Without analysis of the defendant's contention, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that a "[s]entence of
imprisonment for a period which it is provided by law may be imposed
upon conviction for an offense is not cruel and unusual punishment." 10 7
Can it be rationally contended that any term of prison imposed by law
is constitutional? Suppose the legislature had decreed a 100 year term
of imprisonment for selling unregistered securities. Would such a sentence
be sustainable under Godfrey simply because the law allowed it? Hope-
fully, no court would blithely impose such a sentence. 08
One aspect of evolving societal demands has been the insistence upon
speedy and public criminal trials. That right applies with equal force
under Florida's securities laws. In Turner v. Ollif, 10 the defendants
sought a writ of prohibition forbidding a judge from asserting juris-
diction over them on the basis that their motions for a speedy trial in
accordance with the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution had been ignored. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the judge failed to
show cause why the writ of prohibition should not be issued against him
and ordered it so issued.
Is the existence of a "security" a question of law or of fact? The
defendant in Miller v. State"' was charged with criminal securities viola-
tions. Before the jury trial began, the court ruled that the state's evi-
dence, which consisted of stock certificates and promissory notes, consti-
tuted securities as a matter of law. Based upon such ruling, the defendant
pleaded nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal. The court sen-
tenced the defendant to prison, and he appealed on the evidentiary issue.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, holding that in
a criminal proceeding, evidence of the transactions involved should have
been presented to the jury for its determination whether such transactions
constituted securities within the purview of Florida's securities laws.11
Other courts, however, have reasoned that a sounder approach, even
107. Id. at 326.
108. Regarding the circumstances under which sentences may constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment, see Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335, 363-65 (1970). Moreover, the Godfrey
decision does not reflect whether the convictions were for offenses arising from a single
transaction; if so, only one sentence should have been imposed under the Sparks rationale
discussed in the text following note 102 supra.
109. 281 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
110. 285 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
'111. The court relied upon Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961), a criminal case in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit declared that since it is the "peculiar facts of the setting" which transform "an
offer from a mere sale of property into a sale of a security," the trier of fact must
determine the issue. The Roe decision represents the so-called stricter view of the province
of a court in a criminal securities case.
1974] CORPORATE LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 951
in a criminal case, is to determine the existence of a security as a matter
of law." 2 The question of what constitutes a security under Florida's
securities statutes depends upon varying statutory constructions of com-
plex legal definitions. It is sufficiently difficult for a lay jury to attempt
to determine the facts of a controversy. Asking a jury to also determine
if the evidence fits within technical legal abstractions goes beyond the
jury's abilities and would likely produce inconsistent and unjust results.
Such undesirable results would only buttress the claim made by some
that our system of justice is inherently inequitable.
6. SECURITIES AND THE FLORIDA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Although this article does not encompass developments under Flor-
ida's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, developments under
it should be noted, particularly those related to article 8, dealing with
investment securities, and to article 9, dealing with secured transactions."18
112. Other courts, such as those of California, take an opposing view and hold that,
even in a criminal case, whether a security is present is a question solely for the court to
determine; see, e.g., People v. Marvin, 48 Cal. App. 2d 160, 119 P.2d 359 (1941). In a civil
context, courts usually treat the issue of what constitutes a security as a question of law
for the court to determine, particularly where most or all of the material facts are undis-
puted; see, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946) (most of the facts stip-
ulated); Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
113. Regarding the transfer of investment securities under FLA. STAT. ch. 678 (1971) see,
e.g., Phillips v. Zimring, 284 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). The interaction of the securities
law and the Uniform Commercial Code is analyzed in Bell & Arky, Public Investor Protection
and the Need for Regulation of Transfer Agents, 26 Bus. LAw. 1649 (1971); see also note 57
supra and accompanying text.
Regarding transactions wherein securities are used as collateral, as governed by FIA.
STAT. ch. 679 (1971), see, e.g., Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co. v. Bryant, 271 So. 2d 190 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1972).
